Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and its effect on financial markets and institutions by Wannamaker, Edward J.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1988 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 and its effect on financial markets and institutions 
Edward J. Wannamaker 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Wannamaker, Edward J., "Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and its 
effect on financial markets and institutions" (1988). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers. 8559. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8559 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
T h i s  i s  an  u n p u b l i s h e d  m a n u s c r i p t  i n  w h i c h  c o p y r i g h t  
SUBSISTS, An y  f u r t h e r  r e p r i n t i n g  o f  i t s  c o n t e n t s  m u s t  b e
APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR.
MANSFIELD L i b r a r y  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Montana  
D a te  1988
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 and Its Effect on 
Financial Markets and Institutions
By
Edward J. Wannamaker 
B.S., Bucknell University
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Business Administration 
University of Montana 
1988
-.Approved by:
Chairman, Board of Examtners
Deran, Graduate School 
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39360
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
OisssJlation PublisNfig
UMI EP39360
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQ̂ sC
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Preface
This paper covers the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 with a broad stroke. Though 
the Act had more than nine titles, or "sub-acts,” they were 
all related to two areas. These are the focus of the paper: 
the deregulation of the banking and thrift industry and the 
revision of laws used to regulate that industry and the 
economy.
A cause and effect thread is used to track the Act through 
its inception, enactment, and impact on major financial 
institutions, markets in general, and individuals. The 
effects gauged are those of policy and general market 
behavior. There is no intention to analyze details such as 
the day to day operating activities of the Federal Open 
Market Committee.
The research analysis is limited to the period from 1980 to 
1984 and is compared to the late 1970’s. Beyond 1984, the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 
distorted the effects of the 1980 act, and low inflation 
reduced its impact.
\
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Chapter I 
THE ACT ITSELF
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) has its roots in two areas: the
high inflation of the late 1 9 7 0 ’s and the inequities built 
into law that prevented banks and thrifts from competing in 
such an environment.
As early as 1964, the Federal Reserve noted that such 
inequities existed within the its system.
The interests of equity and efficiency would be best 
served if all commercial banks were obligated to observe 
the same reserve standards and if, at the same time, 
such banks were afforded access to the Federal Reserve 
Bank discount window.^
At the time, non-member banks did not have to maintain 
reserves with the Federal Reserve.
When inflation picked up in the late 1960's it hurt the 
earnings of depository institutions as deposits were 
siphoned off to instruments paying unregulated and higher 
interest rates. In response President Nixon set up the Hunt 
Commission to study the situation. The c o m m i s s i o n ’s 1971
^Charles R. McNeil, "The Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980," The Federal 
Reserve B u l l e t i n . 66, (June 1980), p. 444.
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report recommended removing interest rate ceilings paid on 
deposits and allowing thrifts greater latitude in the loans 
they were allowed to offer. The Senate Financial 
Institutions and Nations Economy Study echoed those 
recommendations as inflation once again picked up in the 
mid-1970's.®
Figure 1 
INFLATION RATE
5
10
5
85807570
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1976.
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975), p. 433., 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1988, (Washington, D .C ., 
Bureau of the Census, 1987) p. 450.
It was this inflation, as shown in figure 1, that squeezed 
bank and thrift earnings. Table 1 shows the decline of 
Federal Reserve membership as banks left the system in an 
effort to cut costs. In many cases cost-cutting was
®Peter S, Rose and Donald R. Fraser, F inancial 
Ins t i tut ions. {Plano, Texas, Business Publications Inc. , 
1985), p. 671.
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Table 1 
RESERVE BANK MEMBERSHIP
Year 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
Members 5669 5564 5425 5422 5474 5619 5807 5961
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1982-83, (Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982), p. 503., Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S., 1988,(Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1987), p. 471.
ineffective, as bank and thrift failures increased. These 
pressures brought Congress to pass DIDMCA in 1980. Federal 
Reserve membership subsequently recovered.
Legislative action started in 1975 as the Senate passed 
the Financial Institutions Act. This Act called for 
broadened investment powers and the removal of interest rate 
ceilings. At the same time, the House of Representatives 
was considering a similar bill. It was eventually split 
into three parts, none of which passed the House.
Not until 1978, with Federal Reserve membership still 
declining, were elements of what was to become DIDMCA again 
seriously considered by Congress. This was done in a 
piecemeal fashion. In June, the House Banking Committee 
approved a bill to allow federally chartered savings and 
loans to offer checking accounts where state chartered 
thrifts were offering such accounts.
In July, 1978, the House panel took up the problem of 
reserve membership. Because reserve requirements applied 
only to Federal Reserve members, institutions were dropping
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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their membership in order to cut costs. The original bill, 
as proposed by Rep. William Stanton (R. , Ohio) , would have 
weakened the Federal Reserves’ abilities. It would have 
tied the discount rate to Treasury securities, set reserve 
requirements by law and made the Federal Reserve pay 
interest on the reserves it held.®
Federal Reserve Chairman William Miller opposed these 
actions in a letter to the House panel and in testimony 
before the Senate Banking Committee. He argued that not 
only would it not stop the exodus but that it would severely 
hamper the Federal Reserves’ effectiveness. The Senate was 
considering requiring all financial institutions to place 
reserves with the Federal Reserve and having the Federal 
Reserve pay interest."*
There was no doubt that something needed to be done. In 
the previous eight years, 430 banks had left the Federal 
Reserve while only 103 had joined and the exodus was 
accelerating.®
In September of 1978 the House Banking Committee approved 
in principal, but did not pass, a bill in line with Chairman 
Miller’s views. This bill became the basis for the monetary 
control portion of DIDMCA. It required all depository
®Greg Conderacci,■Anti-Fed Action Backed By Some On 
House P a n e l ," The Wall Street Journal, (July 17, 1978), p. 4
*"Mi 11er Says Erosion of Bank Membership Is Hurting Fed 
Goals , ‘ The Wall Street Journal, (Aug. 15, 1978), p. 2.
°Ib i d ., p . 2.
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institutions to maintain reserves as determined by the 
Federal Reserve but within a range set by law. The reserves 
applied to checking and savings accounts as well as time 
deposits. The first $50 million in checking and savings 
deposits was exempt as well as the first $50 million in time 
deposits. Though this was intended to give smaller 
institutions a chance to compete, it effectively left 90 
percent of commercial banks with no reserve requirements.
Three other provisions of this bill were included in 
DIDMCA. It allowed all federally insured institutions 
access to the Federal Reserves’ discount window and required 
the Federal Reserve to charge for services. It also 
required all institutions to report deposits to the Federal 
Reserve. Previously, only Federal Reserve members had to 
report.
The bill did not include provisions calling for the 
discount rate to be tied to Treasury securities, nor did it 
call for the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves.®
It was not until mid-1979 that the bill passed the entire 
Ho u s e .
Action on a similar bill was postponed by the Senate 
Banking Committee until 1979 due to opposition from the 225 
non-member banks that would be required to institute 
reserves and the American Bankers Association.
® 'House Banking Panel Approves Bill On Reserves, The 
Wall Street Journal. (Sep. 13, 1978), p. 2.
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In April, 1979, a court ruling brought banking practices 
into play. Federal regulators had been allowing banks to 
have automatic transfers from savings to checking accounts, 
savings and loans to operate automatic tellers in different 
locations, and credit unions members to write "share 
drafts," or checks. The American Bankers Association 
brought suit against the National Credit Union Association. 
The Independent Bankers association brought suit against the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. And, the U.S. League of 
Savings Associations brought suit against the FDIC and the 
Federal Reserve. All claimants stated that unfair practices 
were taking place to circumvent regulations. A federal 
appeals court in Washington, D . C . , agreed with all three 
plaintiffs in one ruling. The court ruled that only the 
Congress could allow such activities and that the regulators 
had overstepped their authority.
However, the court also ruled that because it would cause 
a financial strain to shut down these operations 
immediately, its desist order would not take affect until 
January 1. 1980. In essence, the court was giving Congress
time to make rules on these m a t t e r s .
In June, 1979, the House Banking Committee finally passed 
the bill to help stop banks from leaving the Federal Reserve 
system. The bill was essentially the same as that approved 
in principal in 1978. The differences were in the reserve 
requirements. Reserves were only required on transaction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deposits above $35 million and short term commercial time 
deposits above $10 million. Unlike the earlier bill there 
were no reserve requirements on savings, personal time 
deposits, or commercial long term deposits. The net effect 
would be that only 1,000 institutions would be required to 
have reserves compared with the 5,500 holding reserves in 
June 1979. Of the 1,000 institutions, 700 were existing 
Federal Reserve members . In July this measure passed the 
entire House.
In early September, The House Banking Committee passed a 
bill to deal with the earlier court ruling. In each case, 
automatic transfers, automatic tellers, and "share drafts,’ 
the bill allowed the activities to continue. The committee 
also tacked on a provision to allow negotiated order 
withdrawal (NOW) accounts at thrifts and banks nationwide. 
These accounts were previously only available in New 
England.
Also, in September, the Senate took up two bills similar 
to those passed in the House. The bill to stop banks from 
leaving the Federal Reserve had a new twist. It would 
require reserves only on transaction accounts at all 
federally insured institutions, but only if the Federal 
Reserves’ coverage of the nation’s deposit base fell to 67.5
' Measure To Stem Exodus of Banks From Fed Gains," The 
Wall Street Journal. (June 6, 1979), p. 4.
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percent. In September, that coverage stood at 72 percent.® 
This bill never passed the entire Senate.
The Senate Banking Committee also considered a bill to 
cover the earlier court ruling. It was essentially the same 
as the House version with one exception. The committee 
added a provision to eliminate Regulation Q interest rate 
ceilings. The ceilings would be phased out over a ten year 
period beginning in two years. In 1979, banks were limited 
to paying 5 and 1/4 percent interest on savings and thrifts 
were limited to 5 and 1/2 percent.
By the time this bill passed the Senate floor it contained 
two additional provisions. One would temporarily suspend 
state imposed interest rate ceilings on business and 
agriculture loans. The other placed a moratorium on foreign 
takeover of domestic banks.
As Congress* 1979 session came to a close the full House 
had passed a bill on Federal Reserve membership, but the 
Senate had not. And the full Senate had passed a bill based 
on the court cases, N OW accounts, and Regulation Q, but the 
House had not. Before they recessed for the holidays, the 
Congress was able to pass stopgap measures that would let 
the bank and thrift industry operate as before. It allowed 
draft shares, automatic transfers, and automatic tellers to 
continue until March 31, 1980. It also extended existing
®Edward F. Smith, "Bills Move As Banks Watch Volcker, 
ABA Banking J o u r n a l . 71, (Sep. 1979), p. 5.
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Regulation Q ceilings, which were due to expire at the end 
of 1979, until March 31. It was hoped that both houses 
could come up with a compromise bill by that time.
As the 1980 session opened. Senate Banking Committee 
Chairman William Proxmire (D., Wis.) said that they would 
not take up the House passed bill until the House took up 
the Senate passed bill. Representative Henry Reuss (D.,
Wis.) of the House Banking Committee said that the House 
would not take up the Senate passed bill until the Senate 
took up the House passed bill.® But lobby efforts and the 
growing crisis eventually brought the two together.
Big banks were enthusiastic about raising interest rates 
ceilings because it would stop the money flowing to money 
market mutual funds. Small banks and thrifts were worried 
that they could not afford the high rates. The thrifts were
worried that they would be especially hard hit as their
portfolios contained many low yielding mortgages.
The Federal Reserve stated that it believed paying 
interest on reserves would stop banks from leaving the
Reserve system but it did not want to lose the authority to
alter reserve requirements and discount rates. Most in 
Congress believed that paying interest on reserves would put 
an unnecessary strain on the national budget.
Federal Reserve policies implemented in October 1979 had
®Christopher Conte, 'Congress Tackles Controversial 
Bank Legislation Again," The Wall Street J o u r n a l , (Jan. 23, 
1980). p . 3.
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caused interest rates to escalate further reducing the 
earnings of financial institutions. In January, the House 
began considering lifting Regulation Q ceilings with a 
complete phase out by the end of 1985.
New Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker continued to 
urge Congress to pass legislation on Federal Reserve 
membership. In the 13 months covering January, 1979, to 
January, 1980, 69 banks with $7 billion in deposits had
given notice that they would leave the Reserve system. 
(Another 670 banks were considering leaving.) By February, 
1980, the percentage of deposits covered by the Reserve 
system had dropped to 70 percent.
Also in February, the Carter Administration began to push 
for legislation. Former Federal Reserve Chairman, now 
Treasury Secretary, William Miller endorsed the plan to 
reduce reserve requirements but require all institutions to 
hold reserves without receiving interest payments.
Federal regulators then endorsed a five year phase out 
plan for Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. They stated 
that high inflation and high real interest rates were 
severely hurting depository institutions. Ten years was too 
long to wait for phase out while five years gave them enough 
flexibility to deal with any problems that might come up.
In early March, with their deadline approaching and no new 
bills passed by either house. House and Senate conferees got
'Ibid. . p. 3
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together to hammer out a bill acceptable to both houses.
The final bill combined the different bills passed by the 
House and Senate. It also included other proposals that 
were not included in bills passed by either house. It was 
signed into law by President Carter on March 31, 1980. The
6 1 page document is summarized below. ^
Title I - Monetary Control Act
- Required reserves on all transaction accounts at all 
depository institutions eligible for federal insurance.
Three percent required for the first $25 million and between 
8 and 14 percent required for deposits above $25 million. 
Though the Federal Reserve was free to vary reserve 
requirements for deposits above $25 million between these 
ranges, the reserve requirement was initially set at 12 
p e r c e n t . The Federal Reserve could also adjust the $25 
million base to reflect changes in total transaction
depos its.
- Required an initial reserve requirement on all n o n ­
personal time deposits, at all depository institutions 
eligible for federal insurance, of three percent while 
allowing the Federal Reserve to adjust the rate from zero to 
nine percent.
- Phased in n ew reserve requirements over four years for 
current Federal Reserve members and eight years for n o n ­
members .
- Allowed Federal Reserve to impose a supplemental reserve 
requirement of up to four percent in extraordinary 
situations for a period of up to 180 days. It would be 
required to pay interest on the supplemental reserves.
 ̂̂  Summary extracted from: Charles R. MeNi e 1 and Denise
M. R e c h t e r , 'The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 , ' Federal Reserve B u l l e t i n . 6, 
June 1980, pp. 444-453. , Digest of General Public Bills and 
Resolutions, 96th Congress. 2nd S e s s i o n , (Washington, D.C., 
Library of Congress, 1981) , pp. 104-106. , Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac. 96th Congress, 2nd S e s s i o n , (Washington, 
D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1981), pp. 275-277.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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- Extended reserve requirements to U.S. deposits of foreign 
banks operating in the U.S.
- Instructed the Federal Reserve to charge for its services.
- Entitled all depository institutions maintaining reserves 
to have access to the Federal Reserves' discount window.
- Authorized Federal Reserve to buy and sell obligations 
guaranteed by foreign governments.
- Required all depository institutions to report deposits to 
the Federal Reserve as it determines.
Title II - Depository Institutions Deregulation Act
- Instituted the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Committee (DIDO made up of the heads of the Federal 
Reserve, the FDIC, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the 
National Credit Union Association, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury. In addition the Comptroller of the Currency would 
participate as a non-voting member.
- Directed the DIDC to phase out the Regulation Q interest 
rate ceilings by March 3 1 ,  1 9 8 6 .
- Gave the DIDC authority to approve new types of accounts.
Title III - Consumer Checking Account Equity Act
- Permitted federally insured institutions to offer MOW 
accounts.
- Permitted all commercial banks to offer automatic transfer 
of funds.
- Permitted federally chartered savings and loans to operate 
remote automatic teller machines.
- Permitted federally insured credit unions to offer share 
draf ts .
- Revised upward the amount of federal insurance on deposits 
from * 4 0 , 0 0 0  to * 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Title IV - Powers of Thrift Institutions
- Permitted federally chartered savings and loans to invest 
up to 20 percent of their assets in consumer loans, 
commercial paper, or corporate debt.
- Permitted federal savings and loans to make real estate 
loans to the same extent as federal banks with no geographic 
restricti o n s .
- Replaced $75,000 limit on federal saving and loan 
mortgages with limit based on the appraised value of the 
property: 66 and 2/3 percent on unimproved property, 75 
percent on property under improvement, 90 percent on 
improved property, and more than 90 percent in special 
circumstances such as low income housing.
- Allowed savings and loans to invest in money markets and 
issue credit cards.
- Permitted federal mutual savings banks to invest up to 
five percent of assets in commercial loans made within the 
ban k ’s state or within 75 miles of the home office.
- Permitted credit unions to offer mortgages on cooperative 
hous i n g .
- Permitted credit unions to raise lending rates to 15 
percent and authorized the NCUA to allow higher rates when 
the situation dictated.
Title V - State Usury Laws
- Permanently pre-empted state usury ceilings on mortgage 
loans unless overridden by a state within three years.
- Pre-empted for three years only state usury ceilings on 
business and agricultural loans above $25,000 unless 
overridden by a state.
- Established interest rate ceilings on all state chartered, 
federally insured institutions of one percent more than the 
discount rate on all loans unless overridden by the state.
- Permanently disallowed any state imposed ceilings in 
interest rates paid on deposits.
Title VI - Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act
- Required simple English to be used in disclosure 
s tatemen t s .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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- Directed the Federal Reserve to produce model forms for 
disclosure statements.
Title VII - Amendments to National Banking Laws
- Extended the time requirement for national banks and bank 
holding companies to dispose of impermissible land holdings.
- Permitted the Comptroller, upon Federal Reserve request, 
to inspect foreign operations of domestic banks.
- Disallowed any new acquisitions of trust companies by out 
of state banks until October 1, 1981, unless permitted by 
the state of the acquired trust. Includes trust in the 
definition of a bank.
- Permitted Comptroller to shut down a bank if its practices 
are judged unsound.
Title VIII - Financial Regulation Simplification Act
- Directed federal regulators to review their regulations to 
insure they are needed, clear, concise, and do not overlap 
or conflict with those of another agency.
Title IX - Foreign Control Of U.S. Financial Institutions
- Disallowed, until July 1, 1980, the foreign acquisition of
more than five percent of any domestic depository 
institution except under special circumstances.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter II 
THE INSTITUTIONS
Much of DIDMCA was effective immediately. This included 
those measures that could bring immediate, though temporary, 
relief without disrupting markets such as state usury rules 
and anti - takeover rules and the permanent non-disruptive 
portions such as raising insurance coverage. It also 
included the legalization of previously "illegal acts' such 
as share drafts and automatic tellers.
The sections that took time to implement were those that 
would have a major impact on institutions and the economy. 
Regulations had to be written by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board to provide guidance on the expanded investment powers 
of the savings and loan industry. The Federal Reserve had 
to determine a price structure for its services and provide 
guidelines for truth in lending. NOW accounts were delayed 
so that depository institutions and the Federal Reserve 
could determine how to cope with the new accounts. All 
federal regulators had to review their regulations. These 
areas were all in effect within a year.
The two sections that had the biggest impact took 
several years to implement. The implementation of new
15
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Table 2 
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
Reserve Requirement 
Prior to DIDMCA 
(as % of deposits)
7 
9 . 5 
11 . 75 
11 . 75
12. 75 
16 . 25
3 
2 . 5 
1 
6 
2 . 5 
1
3 
2 . 5 
1 
6 
2 . 5 
1
Account 
Type 
(mi 11 ions)
Demand 
0-2 
2-10 
10-25 
25-100 
100-400 
400 +
Savings 
Non-Personal Time
0-5. 30-179 days
180 days-4 yrs, 
4 yrs. +
5 +, 30-179 days
180 days-4 yrs. 
4 yrs +
Personal Time
0-5 , 30- 179 days
180 days-4 yrs. 
4 yrs . +
5 +, 30-179 days
180 days-4 yrs. 
4 yrs .
Reserve Requirement 
Af ter DIDMCA 
(as % of deposits)
3
3
3
12
12
12
3
3
3
3
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Robert D. Auerbach, Money, Banking, and Financial M a r kets. 
(New Y o r k , Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982), p. 105.
reserve requirements was phased in over four years for 
member banks and eight years for non-member institutions. 
The Federal Reserve set up milestones for institutions to 
meet in this goal. Those with less reserves than required 
had to increase them 1/8th or 1/4th of the way to the new 
requirement each year. New types of accounts, such as the 
NOW accounts, established after March 31, 1980 were subject
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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immediately to the new reserve requirements. Prior to 
implementation, Federal Reserve member banks were required 
to hold the reserves shown in table 2 above.
The new reserve requirements brought about a drop in total 
reserves held. Figure 2 shows that reserves held did not 
return to pre-DIDMCA levels until 1985. This undoubtedly 
played a part in the recovery from the recession of 1982.
As the economy and money supply grew, reserves did not keep 
pace, leaving more money available for expansion.
Figure 2
TOTAL RESERVES HELD 
(Billions of dollars)
60
TOTAL RESERVES
198019701950
Source: 1987 Historical Chartbook, {Washington, D.C., Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 1987), p. 2.
The biggest impact for the banking customer took six years 
to implement: the phase out of Regulation Q ceilings on
interest rates paid on deposits. In order to accomplish 
this task, the Congress established the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The DIDC began by tieing time deposit interest rates to 
Treasury Securities. Prior to implementation the maximum 
rate was 7.75 percent while six month commercial paper was 
paying 13.5 percent. The security the deposit was tied to 
depended on the length of the deposit. The DIDC then began 
to remove ceilings on long term time deposits and working 
its way down to shorter and shorter time deposits.
By March, 1986, all that was left was the decontrol of 
passbook savings accounts. At the time, the ceiling was 5.5 
percent. But as figure 3 shows, market interest rates were
Figure 3 
MARKET INTEREST RATES
PERCENT PER ANNUM
COMMERCIAL PAPER
I-MONIH I
AAA CORPORATE OONOS
SIANOAPO C POOR"s
(OATA n o t  AVAICAQIE AFTER 19831
1020 1 0 3 0 1070 199 0105 01 0 4 0
Source: 1987 Historical Chartbook, (Washington, D.C., Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1987), p. 96.
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low enough that when the ceilings were removed on April 1, 
most institutions did not raise rates.
As a single institution, the Federal Reserve was most 
affected by DIDMCA. Overall, the Federal Reserve gained 
more control over the economy. Not because it gained more 
reserves, in fact total reserves dropped slightly 
immediately following implementation, but because it gained 
wider and more discretionary power and more information.
While the dollar amount of reserves dropped, the number of 
institutions required to hold reserves rose from 5,500 to 
40,000.1 This, at a time when Federal Reserve policy was to 
control the economy through the manipulation of reserve 
requirements rather than through interest rates. This gave 
the Federal Reserve control over a wider spectrum of 
ins t i tutions.
The discretionary power to impose supplemental reserves 
was gained for use only if the economy were to spin wildly 
out of control. But, as with any market, the psychological 
impact helped.
The Federal Reserve also gained information because of 
DIDMCA. All institutions were required to report deposit 
information to the Federal Reserve. Institutions with 
deposits of $15 million or more began weekly reporting in 
October of 1980. Institutions with deposits between $2
1'A Bill That Will Give The Fed More Power," Bus m e s s  
Week . 2629, (Mar. 24, 1980), p. 49.
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million and $15 million began monthly reporting in January, 
1981. And institutions with deposits of $2 million or less 
began quarterly reporting in May, 1981.*
More information became available as non-member 
institutions had access to the discount window and Federal 
Reserve services. By monitoring these functions the Federal 
Reserve could glean more data.
In effect, the Federal Reserve lost a large amount of 
control over a relatively small number of banks, but gained 
small control over a large number of institutions while 
having information on those institutions’ activities.
With the increased control came confusion. In the past, 
the Federal Reserve had defined Ml, as all cash and 
transaction accounts. Money that account holders planned to 
spend. Savings that earned interest were included in M2, a 
lesser used tool. With the advent of automatic transfers, 
NOW accounts and share drafts the lines blurred between 
transaction accounts and savings accounts. How could the 
Federal Reserve distinguish between what moneys were going 
to flow into the economy and what moneys were to be held 
back as savings?
Eventually, interest bearing checking accounts were 
included in M l , but the Federal Reserve paid less attention 
to it in determining monetary policy. Its short term 
fluctuations had less significance as people kept savings in
Ibid., p , 68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
interest bearing checking accounts. This became more 
prevalent as market interest rates came down and the 
opportunity costs of doing so became less. Instead of 
paying strict attention to Ml, the Federal Reserve set wider 
growth targets for it, while giving more attention to other 
money measures and interest rates than it had previously.
The ability of the Federal Reserve to invest in foreign 
government securities aided, though in a small way, the 
taxpayer of the United States. Prior to DIDMCA the Federal 
Reserve would place foreign exchange it bought in exchange 
operations in bank accounts in the nation to whom the 
currency belonged. In many cases it was illegal for those 
banks to pay interest on the deposits. By being able to 
invest in foreign government securities the Federal Reserve 
was able to earn a profit. When returned to dollar 
denominations, the profits were turned over to the Treasury. 
In 1982 this amounted to $32 million.®
The impact on other regulators were not so profound. The 
Comptroller and the FDIC were the least affected. As shown 
in table 3, banks remained financially strong overall and 
grew in number only moderately after 1981. Beyond 
streamlining regulations and changing reserve requirements, 
there was little change in rules covering bank practices. 
Bank failures did increase in the early 1980's, but this
^Charles J. Partee, "Statement to Congress," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 69, (Mar. 1983), p. 193.
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should be attributed to hard economic times and poor loans 
rather than to DIDMCA.
Table 3
INSURED BANKS, FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Number Deposits Equi ty/ Qvt .
o f (bill ions Depos i ts Aided
Year Banks of dollars) (x 100) Banks
1977 14,412 1,117 7 . 1 6
1978 14 ,391 1 , 234 7 . 1 7
1979 14 , 364 1 ,363 7 . 1 10
1980 14,435 1,48 1 7 . 3 10
1981 14,4 15 1 , 589 7 . 4 10
1982 14 , 452 1 ,707 7 . 6 42
1983 14,464 1 .843 7 . 6 48
1984 14,481 1 ,963 7 . 9 79
Source : Statistical Abstract of the U.S. , 1986, (Washington,
D.C,, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985), pp. 495-496.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the FSLIC did 
have more difficulties. Through DIDMCA, thrifts gained more 
leeway in how they could invest deposits. This made the 
regulator’s job more difficult. New regulations had to be 
written to cover these areas and oversight became more 
complex. As with banks, savings and loan failures 
i ncreased.
Different from banks, however, was the drop in equity as a 
percentage of deposits. The increase in investment 
authority lead to an increase in risky investments. Savings 
and loan failures far out paced bank failures drawing money
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from the FSLIC. This was especially true in the recession 
year of 1902.
Table 4
SAVINGS AND LOANS, FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Number Deposits Equi ty/ Gvt.
of (bil1 ions Deposits AidedYear S&L's of dollars) Cx 100) S&L's1977 4,761 387 6 . 3 na1978 4,725 431 6 . 5 na
1979 4.684 470 6 . 7 na
1980 4,613 511 6 . 4 33
1981 3 , 292 525 5 . 4 79
1982 3,825 568 4 . 6 210
1983 3,502 635 5 . 3 54
1984 3 ,393 725 5 . 3 17
Sources : Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1982-83, (Washington,
D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982), p. 509., Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S., 1986, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1985), p. 499., Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1968 
(Washington, B.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987), pp. 476-477.
No relationship between DIDMCA and the activities or 
policies of the Security Investors Protection Corporation or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission is discernable.
The number of banks was in decline prior to DIDMCA.
Unable to pay high interest rates, big money was going to 
money market funds. From 1978 to 1979 money market fund 
assets quadrupled. State usury laws kept interest rates 
charged on loans below market rates. As inflation grew, it 
became increasingly unprofitable to be in the business of 
banking.
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Table 5
COMMERCIAL BANKS. ASSETS 
{figures in billions of dollars)
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commerc. & Indust. Loans 207 237 266 283 330 383 405
Commercial Mortgages 75 87 93 101 113 125 142
Residential Mortgages 102 125 144 154 163 167 177
Farm Mortgages 8 9 9 9 8 8 8
Institutional Loans 44 56 49 47 57 74 77
Security Loans 17 15 14 13 15 14 17
Farm Loans 26 28 31 32 33 36 39
Consumer Loans 142 168 188 182 187 193 218
Other Loans 18 20 21 22 27 34 42
All Loans 632 738 814 842 933 1033 1126
Less Write-offs ( 22) ( 26) { 29) ( 30) ( 31) ( 32) ( 33)
Net Loans 611 712 785 812 902 1002 1094
Government Securities 211 215 222 251 255 274 327
Other Securities 50 57 66 75 88 102 104
Total Securities 261 272 288 326 342 375 431
Cash 8t Equivalents 170 189 199 202 197 211 228
Other Assets 81 101 103 132 159 186 186
Total Assets 1177 1329 1438 1544 1629 1878 2032
Number of Banks 14738 14741 14738 14704 14718 14763 14789
Source; Statistical Abstract of the U.S. , 1985, (Washington, D.C. , U.S.
Bureau of the C e n s u s ,1984), p. 494.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
With DIDMCA came relief. Though all banks were now 
required to hold reserves, they had the ability to charge 
market interest rates on their loans. They were able to 
offer more services, such as automatic transfers and NOW’s, 
and able to pay higher interest rates. This enabled them to 
attract more deposits. With these reversals, the decline in
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the number of banks was also reversed. As shown in table 3 
and 5, banking became profitable again.
Column five of table 3, shows that more banks failed 
after DIDMCA than before. As DIDMCA did not change the 
investment practices for banks it cannot be directly 
attributable for this increase. While having to pay more 
for deposits and holding reserves increased costs , the 
industry as a whole grew more profitable. It is more likely 
that the reason more banks failed was poor management. The 
industry became more competitive and those that could not 
compete dropped out.
Table 6
S A V I N G S  A N D L O A N S , A S S E T S
( f i g u r e s in b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s )
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Mortgages 381 433 476 503 519 483 495 555
Cash & Equiv. 39 45 46 58 63 85 104 125
Other Assets 39 46 57 69 83 139 174 223
Total Assets 459 524 579 630 664 707 773 904
As % Y r . Prior 114 110 109 105 106 109 117
Total S&L's 4761 4725 4684 4613 4292 3825 3502 3393
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1 9 82-63, (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Bur e a u  of the Census, 1982), p. 509., Statistical Abstract of the 
U.S. 1 9 8 6 . (Washington, B.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985),p. 498., 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1 9 8 8 , (Washington, B.C., U.S. Bureau 
of the Census. 1987), p. 476.
The thrift industry needed DIDMCA in order to compete with 
banks and money markets in attracting deposits. Table 6
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shows thrift assets increasing but at a slowing rate prior 
to DIDMCA. Asset growth picked up after DIDMCA.
However, DIDMCA was not enough. As shown in table 4, 
their deposits did increase, but this can be deceiving. The 
amount of increase from 1980 to 1981 was 2.5 percent. This 
is less than the interest the thrifts paid. Customers were 
withdrawing more money than they were depositing. It was 
clear that the DIDC was not moving fast enough. This lead 
to the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 
1982 .
The number of thrifts helped by the FHLBB and the FSLIC is 
also deceiving. Though the assets of the thrift industry 
grew, the number of thrifts declined by more than their 
failure rate would indicate. Voluntary liquidations and 
mergers played a greater role than the FHLBB. Again, much 
of this can be attributed to increased investment powers 
during a recession and inflationary times. Saddled with low 
interest mortgages and the need to pay high interest rates, 
thrifts took more risks. When these risks resulted in 
losses, it forced consolidation. Even though the number of 
thrifts was declining prior to DIDMCA. the drop from 1980 to 
1981 and beyond was more dramatic. The increase in non­
mortgage investments corresponds with consolidation.
*See Appendix for explanation of Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
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Thrifts were also disadvantaged by less experience. 
Transaction accounts and loose lending requirements were new 
to them as an industry. The learning curve became an added 
expense.
Taking the bank and thrift industry as one, the effects of 
DIDMCA can be seen in several areas. The lines of 
distinction between types of institutions became blurred. 
Prior to DIDMCA, thrifts could not offer demand accounts and 
were limited in their lending. Banks were forced to pay 
lower interest rates. After DIDMCA, all offered demand 
accounts, thrifts gained investment opportunities previously 
only open to banks and banks gained parity in interest paid.
This lead to greater competition between all institutions 
for a deposit base. Within the limits set by the DIDC, many 
different types of accounts were offered with varying 
maturities and varying interest rates and varying compound 
rates. Much of the money going into these new accounts came 
from passbook savings. So that at the same time 
institutions were fighting each other, they were losing a 
low cost source of funds and paying higher interest rates.
Competition was indeed fierce among depository 
institutions. As table 7 shows, the decline in the number 
of institutions continued after DIDMCA. Only banks managed 
to add to their total number after DIDMCA. Though all types 
of institutions had asset growth, credit union and savings 
bank growth was less strong. Competition with banks and
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T a b l e  7
D E P O S I T O R Y  I N S T I T U T I O N S .  NUMBERS AND ASSETS  
( A s s e t s  i n  b i l l i o n s  o f d o l l a r s )
B a n k s S & L ' s c. u. •s S . E . ■ s
Y e a r No . A s s e t s No . A s s e t s No . A s s e t  s N 0 . A s s e t s
1 9 7 7 1 4 7 3 8 1 1 7 7 4 7 6  1 4 5 9 2 2 3 3 0 54 4 6 7 147
1 S7S 1 4 7 4  1 1 3 2 9 4 7 2 5 52 4 2 2 1 0 6 6 2 4 6 5 158
1S 7 9 1 4 7 3 8 1 4 3 8 4 6 6 4 5 7 9 2 2 0  12 6 6 46 3 158
1 9 8 0 1 4 7 0 4 1 5 4 4 46 13 6 3 0 2 1 4 6 5 7 3 4 6 0 167
1 SB 1 1 4 7 1 8 1 6 2 7 4 2 9 2 6 6 4 2 0 6 9 7 7 2 4 5 4 185
1 9 6 2 1 4 7 6 3 1 8 7 8 3 8 2 5 7 0 7 1 9 8 9 0 8 2 4 2 3 184
1 9 S3 1 4 7 8 9 2 0 3 2 3 5 0 2 7 7 3 1 5 8 7 7 82 53 4 26 1
Sour ce: ; S t a t i s t i c a l  Abs t r a c t  of the U . S . . 196: - S3 ,  (Wash t n g t o n , D . C . . U.S. Bureau
of  the Census. 19621.  pp . 505- 510 . ,  S t a t i s t i c a l Abs t r a c t of the U . S . .  19 Î  5
(Washin gt on.  D. C . . U. S. Bureau of the Census) . 1964.  pp. 494- 507
s a v i n g s  a n d  l o a n s  is t h e  m o s t  l i k e l y  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s .  W i t h  
l e s s  r e s o u r c e s , c r e d i t  u n i o n s  a n d  s a v i n g s  b a n k s  w e r e  n o t  
a b l e  t o  c o m p e t e  i n  a d v e r t i s i n g  a n d  i n  t h e  t y p e s  of d e a l s  
o f f e r e d .  T h e i r  c h a r t e r s  a l s o  l i m i t e d  t h e i r  a r e a s  of 
o p e r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  c l i e n t e l e  t h e y  w e r e  a b l e  to r e c r u i t .  A s
t h e  i n d u s t r y  m o  v e d  m o  r e  t o  w a  r d s  a  s e l l i n g  a p p r o a c h ,  t h e y  
w e r e  l e f t  b e h i n d .
A l s o ,  r e s e r v e  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  h a r d e s t  o n  
t h e  s m a l l e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  n o t  m e m b e r s  of 
t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e .  H a v i n g  r e s e r v e s  m e a n t  l e s s  m o n e y  to  
l e n d  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  l e s s  e a r n i n g s .  T h e  t w o  p a g e  f o r m  u s e d  
to r e p o r t  d e p o s i t  b a l a n c e s  w a s  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  S O  p a g e s  of 
i n s  t r u e  t i o n .’
^ W i l l i a m  ?. B r a y ,  A B A  B a n k i n g  J o u r n a l , 72 ,  ( D e c . , 
1 9 3 0 )  , p . 7 4 .
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Even though interest rates paid by the banks and thrifts 
rose under the DIDC, money still left the industry.
Interest rates were not rising fast enough to match money 
market rates. This was remedied by the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982. It was at that time 
brokerage firms took notice of the rising bank rates.
A 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act allowed 
nonf inancial institutions to begin banking type activities. 
These activities were limited to either taking deposits or 
making loans, but not both. Relaxed lending rules made such 
activities more lucrative. Also, distressed savings and 
loans and banks became an inexpensive way to enter the 
market.
Table 8
Non-Bank/Thrift Financial Assets 
(figures in billions of dollars)
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Finance Cos. 133 158 185 199 226 236 260 294
Invest. Cos. 45 46 51 63 64 90 129 162
Sec. Dealers 28 28 29 36 39 43 49 61
Total 206 232 265 298 329 369 438 517
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1 9 8 6 , (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985), p. 489.
Much literature was written at the time that this was the 
wave of the future, the facts do not bear this out. Table 8 
shows DIDMCA had no affect on such operations. Non­
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bank/thrift assets grew no faster than bank or thrift 
assets.
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Chapter III 
The Markets
DIDMCA was destabilizing only for the most liquid markets 
- bank and thrift deposits. Those with large accounts at 
financial institutions moved their deposits to higher 
yielding time deposits and money markets. Initially small 
savers were left out of this market as the minimum 
certificate was *20,000 for short term certificates and 
*10,000 for long term certificates. The DIDC eventually 
lowered this to *1,000 and small savers gained better 
access .
Table 9, on the following page, shows that not only was 
money moving from low interest passbook deposits to high 
interest time deposits, but no-interest transaction and 
small passbook deposits moved to NOW type accounts where 
both interest and services were available.
These moves greatly increased the cost of money for the 
institutions. Profits were squeezed as competition grew.
In an effort to deal with the situation, institutions 
offered many different products with varying maturities, 
interest rates and penalties. Within an institution, the 
products varied greatly due to the volatility of actual
3 1
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interest rates and institutional strategy varying between 
short term and long term.
Table 9
ACCOUNT TYPES AND DEPOSITS 
(figures in billions of dollars)
AT/Shares/
Year Checking N O W ’s Savings T i me MMDA* MMMF1977 240 5 487 599 - 4
1978 254 9 476 728 — 1 1
1979 264 17 4 17 872 - 44
1980 269 27 393 1014 - 76
1981 237 77 346 1 129 - 189
1982 241 101 362 1 185 43 234
1983 243 129 3 13 1119 376 179
1984 249 146 290 1302 417 230
Sources: 'Financial and Business Statistics,' Federal Reserve B u l l e t i n , 
68, (Jan., 1982) p. A13., 'Financial and Business Statistics,' Federal 
Reserve B u l l e t i n , 71, (Jan., 1985), p. A13., 'Financial and Business 
Statistics," Federal Reserve B u l l e t i n , 73, (Jan., 1987), p. A13.
Notes: “Money Market Demand Accounts in banks and thrifts. ^Money 
Market Mutual Funds held with brokerage houses.
Table 9 shows that the volume of personal and corporate 
money moving to money market mutual funds continued to grow 
in the early 1980's. It was a relatively safe place to put 
on e ’s money because of liquidity and available transaction 
abilities. This growth was not stemmed until 1983 when the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act took effect.
Examining tables 5 and 6, it appears that DIDMCA had no 
effect on the loan market. It would have been interesting 
to see what the numbers would have been without DIDMCA. The 
cancellation of state usury laws made money available,
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a l b e i t  a t  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  w h e n  it w o u l d  h a v e  d r i e d  up 
in t h e  h i g h  i n f l a t i o n  of t h e  e a r l y  1 9 0 O ' s .
A l t h o u g h  D I D M C A  g a v e  t h e  t h r i f t s  f u r t h e r  l e e w a y  in 
i n v e s t i n g  in c o r p o r a t e  s e c u r i t i e s ,  t h e  A c t  h a d  no 
s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p a c t  on e i t h e r  t h e  b o n d  or s t o c k  m a r k e t s .
W h e n  t h e  e c o n o m y  is v i e w e d  as a w h o l e ,  the e f f e c t  of the 
A c t  is u n c l e a r .  M a n y  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  m u s t  be t a k e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  - n e w  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  p o l i c i e s ,  n e w  R e a g a n  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  g r o w t h  of E u r o p e a n  a n d  A s i a n  
e c o n o m i e s ,  to n a m e  a few. B u t  s o m e  t h i n g s  c a n  b e  i n f e r r e d  
f r o m  t a b l e  10.
T a b l e  10
GROWTH OF ECONOMI C I N D I CAT OP.S
( P e r c e n t change  o v e r p r e u i ous y e a r  )
77 78 79 80 81 82 83_ i l
R e c ’ d.  Re se r ve . s 4 14 5 -  8 3 0 - 7 5
M - 1,  Money S u p p l y 8 a 8 7 6 9 10 6
L ,  Money S u p p l y 12 12 1 1 10 12 10 1 1 12
G r o s s  N a t .  P r o d . * 12 15 12 9 12 4 8 9
Sources : Business S c a t l s t i c s . (Washington, D. C. .  Bureau ol  Bccncnzc
Anal ysi s.  1SS7) , p.  5 3 . ,  S t a t i s t i c a l  Abst ra l  cf  the U . S . . 1SB4 , (Washington,  
B. C. ,  U.S.  Bureau cf  the Census, 1923) ,  pp. 449 & 530. ,  S t a t i s t i c a l  Abst ract  
of the O . S . , (Washington.  B. C. ,  U.S.  Bureau of  the Census, 1967) ,  
pp. 407 & 463.
Note; *1967 c o l l a r s .
T h e  n e g a t i v e  g r o w t h  of r e q u i r e d  r e s e r v e s  f r o m  1 9 8 0  to 1983 
p r o b a b l y  h e l p e d  t h e  e c o n o m y  as t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  e x p a n d e d  
its p o w e r s  to a l l  d e p o s i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  m o v e d  to s t o p  
h i g h  i n f l a t i o n .  L o w  r e s e r v e s  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  l o o s e r  l e n d i n g
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restrictions and deregulated interest rates to counter the 
Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policies. In retrospect, 
DIDMCA was more important for what did not happen than what 
it caused. The recession of 1982 could have been much more 
devastating had DIDMCA not been enacted.
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Chapter IV 
THE INDIVIDUAL
As a whole, the American financial customer has benefited 
from DIDMCA. Today, even though the products are more 
standardized from institution to institution than in the 
early 1980's, there are more opportunities for the average 
bank account holder to earn interest on his deposits. NOW 
accounts and savings accounts are capable of paying market 
interest rates. And those accounts are insured for more 
money.
Lifting state usury laws have made the lending market more 
liquid. Prior to DIDMCA, when market interest rates rose 
above state ceilings, institutional lending dried up.
Today, though one might have to pay higher rates in an 
inflationary environment, the money is available. Table 11. 
on the following page, shows a drop in consumer credit at 
banks and credit unions from 1979 to 1980 with no real 
recovery until 1982. Finance companies not hindered by the 
same regulations grew normally over the same period.
The smallest deposit customers suffered as a result of 
DIDMCA. Because institutions have to pay more to get 
deposits, they have looked to other means to generate
35
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CONSUMER DEBT OUTSTANDING 
(millions of dollars)
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Comm. 
Banks
Finance 
Co s .
Credit 
Un ions Retail
Savings
Inst. Total
1977 1 1 2 , 3 7 4 37,973 37,605 23,490 9,265 223,669
1978 136,016 4 5 , 365 4 4 , 3 3 4 25,987 9,790 264,669
1979 154,177 56,607 46,517 28,119 11,164 3 0 0 , 3 1 3
1980 147,013 6 2 , 2 4 8 4 4 , 0 4 1 28,697 13,935 300,402
1981 1 4 7 , 6 2 2 70,070 4 5 , 9 5 4 31,348 16,547 315,944
1 9 8 2 152,490 75,271 4 7 , 2 5 3 3 2 , 3 9 5 20,615 332,087
1 9 8 3 171,978 83,310 5 3 , 4 7 1 37,582 29,222 379,694
1 9 8 4 211,606 8 9 , 8 8 4 66,165 4 0 , 4 9 2 40,311 4 5 3 , 2 2 3
Source: Business Statistics, 1986, (Washington, D.C., Dept, of Commerce, 1987), p .  66
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revenues. This indicates that services were no longer a 
cost of doing business. Service costs were passed on to the 
customer. Minimum deposits are required in order to prevent 
check writing charges. Penalties for "bouncing" a check 
have increased. For some small depositors, it may actually 
cost money to maintain a checking account. (Charges and 
deposit size vary depending on the institution.)
All investors have gained a wider variety of areas to park 
their cash as a result of DIDMCA. Interest bearing checking 
accounts and various time deposit instruments give high 
yielding options.
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Hailed as the greatest banking measure since the 1930's, 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 fell short of its intended far-reaching 
impact. Congress directed a committee to deregulate 
interest rates paid by depository institutions over a five 
year period. At the end of this period, market interest 
rates were equivalent to previous regulated rates.
DIDMCA abolished state usury ceilings. This, at least 
made money available to those willing to borrow at high 
rates. But, it also assumes that institutions were willing 
to make risky loans in an uncertain environment. With few 
willing to borrow and few willing to lend, there was not an 
appreciable effect on lending markets.
Among those willing to lend were thrifts. They were 
saddled with low interest mortgages. In an effort to offset 
this low income and pay higher interest rates, thrifts made 
high interest, but high risk, investments. Only a small 
percentage of these type investments were allowed prior to 
DIDMCA. This, coupled with the further investment powers
38
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granted under a 1982 banking act and mismanagement, has lead 
to the current instability in the thrift industry.
This instability was driven by competition with banks.
From a customer’s point of view, the differences between 
banks and thrifts were greatly blurred. Each offered the 
same depository vehicles. Each competed for the same 
deposit base. But thrifts were unable to match bank 
earnings without high risk.
One area DIDMCA did have great effect was in Federal 
Reserve operations. The Federal Reserve was given 
opportunities to invest foreign reserves and was made to 
charge for services. This service charge forced it to 
compete with private service companies and so become more 
efficient .
As it provided more services, it gained more information. 
But this information only supplemented its best new 
information source. All depository institutions were 
required to report their deposits to the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve gained the power to apply reserve 
requirements on all institutions. It gained more leeway in 
adjusting reserve requirements. Though the number of 
institutions holding reserves dropped, the Federal Reserve 
gained control over all institutions and so the economic 
incentive to leave the Federal Reserve System was lost.
T h e  i n c r e a s e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  p o w e r  g a v e  t h e  F e d e r a l  
R e s e r v e  m u c h  m o r e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  e c o n o m y .
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This study reveals that further research into DIDMCA's 
effects on U.S. government operations may be valuable.
Three areas, in particular, are of interest: (1) How did the
ability of the Federal Reserve to make a profit in foreign 
reserve operations effect those operations? (2) Were FOMC 
operations greatly altered as a result of more information 
and power? (3) Did simplification of banking regulations 
change the performance and abilities of regulators?
Another area deserves further study. The Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 has been mentioned 
throughout this paper. It would be informative to gage the 
effects of its enactment and how well those effects meshed 
with Congressional intent.
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THE GARN - ST. GERMAIN 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1982
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 
extended the policies of DIDMCA and forced the DIDC to take 
action on some accounts earlier than planned.
The 1982 Act gave thrifts even wider investment power than 
allowed under DIDMCA. This was needed because thrifts were 
having problems meeting the interest payments on deposits. 
The wider powers were needed so that higher yields could be 
obtained to offset low return mortgages.
In an effort to be fair with banks, the Act abolished the 
one quarter percent interest rate differential between banks 
and thrifts. Prior to the Act, banks were forced to pay one 
quarter percent less than thrifts on all deposits.
The Act also directed the DIDC to establish money market 
deposit accounts. Designed to pull money back from 
brokerage firms, these accounts paid market interest rates 
and had transaction capabilities. It was not until the 
passage of this Act that the securities industry took notice 
of rising interest rates at depository institutions. The 
Investment Company Institute filed suit on the grounds that 
because these accounts would be federally insured, they
41
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presented an unfair advantage. The Investment Company 
Institute lost the suit because it was clear brokerage 
houses had an unfair advantage at the time.
Time was given in order that regulators could adjust, but 
the provisions of the Act were to take effect no later than 
Jan. 1, 1983. As stated earlier, except for increased
thrift investment powers, it only sped up what DIDMCA would 
have eventually done.
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